Why do we have eyes? – Experiential Diversification as an intrinsic telos of primordial consciousness

Research Director for the International Association of Near-Death Studies (IANDS), professor, author, and neuroscientist, Marjorie Woollacott has conducted a thorough investigation over the past years, which has revealed remarkable conclusions regarding near-death experiences.

Even though the results of Woollacott’s investigation are reluctantly referred to as anecdotal by some, others consider them to constitute valid empirical evidence.

Be that as it may, the rigour of the cited studies should probably not be disputed, nor should Woollacott’s epistemic authority in the matter at hand.

Therefore, despite accepting the relativity required while assuming those conclusions as our premises, we will construct our metaphysical hypothesis on top of their phenomenological account.

According to individual testimonies, near-death experiences report the possibility of perception without functioning eyes or even brain activity. Thus, a critical question arises within naturalism: why evolve eyes if they are not ultimately necessary for seeing?

A feasible answer to such a conundrum —primordially inspired by Bernardo Kastrup’s ontological thesis— would be the following:

Suppose there is a primordial consciousness at the base of existence with no anthropomorphic will but instead an intrinsic telos of self-experience that could manifest as experiential diversification. That is, a consubstantial drive to experience itself in diverse ways, echoing Plotinus’ necessary irradiation from the One.

In this scenario, diversification might unfold following a dual pattern, both vertically —through graded levels of dissociation— and horizontally —through multiple modes within each level, including biological evolution.

At the most dissociated stratum —the material world— experience may unfold predominantly through a version of what Aristotle called “accident”: in this case, material constraints, though ultimately experiential in essence. Eyes could evolve here because, in this regime, perception must be mediated by physical organs.

Yet, according to NDE reports, in a subtler dissociation relative to the tangible domain, information may be accessed without the body.

Thus, we could fairly describe the body as merely one expression within this experiential telos or diversification, not indispensable for perception, which can occur without it.

Nevertheless, this does not deprive biological evolution of meaning; on the contrary, it is a single form that consciousness necessarily develops to experience itself in all possible ways —the latter consisting in attempts or experiments produced in multiple dissociations and modes.

With specific respect to the eyes, they would develop in the corporeal plane because experience there occurs “accidentally”, with primacy of accidental elements, i.e., matter, over substance. Hence, as materiality dissolves in the ontological hierarchy, the eye would cease as material accident, but the faculty of vision would persist —its origin substantial and mental.

The senses experienced in the elemental realm would progressively “perfect” themselves in further stages: everything accessible materially would be apprehensible more fully as constraints diminish toward the source, where experience would be pure and unrestricted.

Consequently, ontological planes would not collapse upon transition —e.g., death—. In fact, each could endure distinctly, thus accommodating experiences not homologous across them.

The empirical telos might traverse the alluded levels, at least from less to more dissociated —a more plausible thesis— whereas the reverse —from more to less dissociated— would seem more improbable, as it would require overcoming accidentality’s restrictions.

Eyes would thus not be necessary for vision from an ontological perspective, for they could indeed be identified as a constrained expression in one stratum of diversification.

The question might not be one of necessity —as inferred by naturalism’s strained optics— but of experiential diversification.

To that effect, what we consider to be restraints would actually function as incarnations that enrich the irresistible diversity of self-experience.

[Since English is not my native language, this text was developed from my original work in Spanish. A preliminary English version was produced with the assistance of AI model GPT-5.2 and subsequently rewritten and expanded by the author.]

© Abraham Meghji Ramos 2026. This text is protected by copyright. Citation and partial use are permitted with full attribution to the author and a link to the source. Reproduction without credit or for purposes of appropriation is expressly prohibited.